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Abstract—Security compliance has become an important topic
for medium- and large-sized companies in the recent years. In
order to fulfill all requirements legally imposed, high quality
identity management – particularly with respect to correct and
consistent access control – is essential. In this context, the concept
of recertification has proven itself to maintain the quality and cor-
rectness of access rights over a long period of time. In this paper,
we show how the traditional recertification concept can be notably
enhanced through involving the notion of trust. We thereto
propose a trust-based recertification model and demonstrate its
benefits by means of a realistic use case. Our dynamic concept
can help to better spread the recertification overhead compared
to the traditional approach with fixed periods. Furthermore, it
aids in the identification of risky employees.
Keywords—Computational trust, enterprise identity manage-
ment, recertification, access control, compliance, identity and access
management
I. INTRODUCTION
The increase of compliance policies and regulations im-
poses new challenges for medium- and large-sized companies.
To avoid legal consequences, the importance of compliance
within enterprises is growing steadily. Capgemini [1] lists se-
curity compliance among the top IT trends of 2014, expressing
the significance of the topic in practice. Similar conclusions
can be drawn from PwC’s report [2] underlining the increase
of compliance staffing and budget. The handling of sensitive
data, personal data and trading data is subject to several
national and international requirements. As a prerequisite for
registration at the US stock market, the actually national
regulations of the Sarbanes-Oxley-Act from 2002 (SOX, [3])
are affecting companies worldwide. While at first glance not
directly connected to IT systems, the initial requirements of
SOX on accountability and auditing affect areas of Identity
and Access Management (IAM) as well. However, the de-
mands by SOX towards fraud detection, segregation of duties,
compliance and audits can only be delivered with correct and
consistent access control information. Similarly, knowledge
about who can access what within the organization is of
utmost importance in order to adhere to privacy protection of
employee and customer data. Furthermore, continuous internal
and external revisions are obligatory for organizations which
want to acquire certifications of frameworks and standards such
as ISO/IEC 27001 [4]. Additionally, especially regulated indus-
tries such as the finance sector (e.g. through Basel III [5]) and
the health sector (e.g. through HIPAA [6]) are expressing their
need for more automated and helpful tools and measurements
in order to demonstrate proof of their compliance [2].
From a bird’s eye view, structured IAM provides a central-
ized control center for managing (compliance) and reporting
(auditing) users concerning the presented requirements. One
of the practical methods for ensuring the correctness of access
within an organization is the concept of recertification [7].
With these periodic inspections of access rights, an employee’s
correct set of authorizations can be renewed by a domain
expert, thus allowing for the evaluation of audits. The overall
goal of this paper is to aid companies in a semi-automated
conduction of recertifications. In order to achieve this, we
introduce computational trust concepts into the field of IAM.
With this interdisciplinary work, we can help to identify em-
ployees whose access privileges should be recertified more of-
ten than others. This is based on the heterogeneity of employee
positions in organizations. For instance, companies naturally
tend to oblige employees in security relevant functions to be
certified more often than low-privileged colleagues.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We
provide a short overview of the related work relevant to
this paper in Section II before we present our novel trust-
based recertification concept in Section III. In Section IV,
we demonstrate its applicability by means of a use case
using synthetic data based on real-world examples. Finally,
we discuss the benefits and limitations of our proposal and
provide a summary of our contributions and an outlook for
future work in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section, we briefly introduce the most important
characteristics of computational trust and how we use them in
our proposal. This helps to impart a common understanding
regarding the main contribution of the paper. Furthermore,
we demarcate our work from related approaches that try to
introduce trust concepts into IAM.
A. Computational Trust
Trust has been discussed in various research domains for
decades, such as sociology, psychology, and economics. In
this paper, we focus on the meaning of trust in the computer
science community. In particular, we employ the ideas related
to the formalization of trust as a computational concept.
Since Marsh’s [8] early work on this topic, a vast number
of computation models and algorithms has been proposed in
literature. For an extensive overview of the field, the interested
reader is referred to existing surveys (e.g. [9], [10], [11]).
One of the most important properties of trust is its dynamic
nature, meaning that trust can increase and decrease through
new experiences and referrals. Moreover, trust is said to decay
with time. These characteristics lead to the generally accepted
proposition that new trust assessments are more important than
old ones. We take this into account by basing our evaluation
of the users’ trustworthiness on the beta reputation system by
Jøsang and Ismail [12], which relies on the beta probability
density function. As outlined in Section III, beta models are a
popular way to consider the decay of trust assessments.
B. Trust in Identity and Access Management
The integration of trust concepts into IAM has received
increasing attention during the last years. At first, most in-
terest has been dedicated to trust in federated IAM. Liu and
Gao [13], for instance, extend the Security Assertion Markup
Language (SAML) by a trust value that is calculated based on a
subject’s behavior. Employing this value in IAM procedures,
malicious behavior can directly be reflected in inter-domain
access permissions. In this way, subjects are encouraged to act
properly. Moreover, Gao et al. [14] not only address the trust
value of a subject but also involve the trustworthiness of a
service provider in single sign-on mechanisms. They propose
a dynamic trust policy language to support trust negotiation.
Further approaches have been introduced in [15] and [16].
More recently, researchers have also started to consider the
integration of trust into centralized IAM. As we focus on ac-
cess control management in enterprise IAM, these approaches
are particularly relevant to our proposal. Zhao et al. [17],
for example, assign trust values as a minimum requirement
for each role in an RBAC model. In their system, users are
constantly rated by other actors and resources. Consequently,
malicious behavior is directly reflected in a bad trust value and
roles can immediately be revoked. Yang et al. [18] go one step
further and provide trust values for the behavior in different
situations. They argue that the trust value associated with a
subject should be calculated for multiple contexts because the
perception of trust is context-dependent. Further interesting
approaches can be found in [19] and [20].
While the integration of trust in access control models is
definitely a step into the right direction, all current approaches
focus on the extension of one specific access control model
and thus suffer from low flexibility. In this work, we propose
a concept that is independent of the access control model in
use. We thereby focus on the recertification process, which has
also not been addressed in this context so far.
III. TRUST-BASED RECERTIFICATION CONCEPT
Our concept for trust-based recertifications is based on
the generic recertification process depicted in Figure 1. The
process is a simplified version of the IAM lifecycle [21] and
is reduced to the parts directly connected to recertifications.
At first, there has to be an initial provisioning stage in
which an employee is assigned with permissions. In our trust-
based recertification concept, we consider two main com-
ponents: a time-related one and a usage-related one. In the
initial provisioning, the time component is set to the maximum
value (e.g. 1) whereas the usage component is assigned a
neutral value (e.g. 0.5). The second stage represents the actual
Fig. 1. Generic recertification process
activities of the employee between the initial provisioning
and the recertification (or between two recertifications). Since
there may be certain attribute and entitlement updates (e.g.
acquiring permissions that are not officially approved), it is
necessary to have domain experts assess conspicuous access
control outliers. Depending on the outcome of the assessments,
the usage-based trust value of the employee may increase
or decrease. Irrespectively of this, his time-based trust value
steadily decreases. Once the total trust value reaches a certain
threshold, the recertification stage becomes necessary. Simi-
larly to the initial provisioning, the recertification sets the time-
related component back to the maximum value.
In the following, the different elements important during
the usage stage are explained in detail. These are the time-
related component (i.e. the temporal decay of trust), the
usage-related component (i.e. the outlier assessments), and the
recertification threshold.
A. Temporal Decay of Trust
As pointed out in Section II, one of the most important
properties of trust is its decay with time. We take this into
consideration with a time-related component. The component
has to be defined in such a way that the total trust value reaches
the ultimate threshold when the recertification is mandatory
at the latest. This point in time is predefined by compliance
requirements such as Basel III and SOX. For the sake of
simplicity, we use the following linear decay function for the
time-related component. It reaches 0 by no later than after one
year, which we use as the predefined recertification deadline.
Note that the linear decay function can easily be replaced by a
progressive function, for instance. Similarly, the recertification
deadline may be adapted to an organization’s specific needs.
Trustt(t) = 1− (ωxx+ ωyy) t
360
(1)
Trustt is the time component of the total trust value, t is
the number of days since the last recertification, and (ωxx +
ωyy) is the decay factor. The default value for (ωxx + ωyy)
is 1, so that Trustt reaches 0 at the predefined recertification
deadline of one year. ωx and ωy are used as weighting factors,
whereby ωx + ωy = 1.
x considers properties of the observed employee such as
his position in the organization and the characteristics of his
contract. Table I provides an exemplary overview of these
properties along with possible scales for their values xk. x
is defined as the average of these values. We use a scale
from 1 to 2 with steps of 0.25, which results in five possible
values per property. Preliminary considerations have shown
the appropriateness of this scale. Nevertheless, more detailed
observations might be considered for future work.
TABLE I. EXEMPLARY EMPLOYEE PROPERTIES
Employee property Possible scale
Position From manager (x1 = 1) to clerk (x1 = 2)
Entry date From more than 30 years ago (x2 = 1) to newly
arrived employee (x2 = 2)
Contract type From permanent contract (x3 = 1) to external contract
(x3 = 2)
Job history From loyal employee (x4 = 1) to competitor history
(x4 = 2)
y is affected by the criticality levels of the permissions
of the employee. In order to assign a value to y, we use a
classification scheme which is exemplary outlined in Table II.
Similarly to the aforementioned employee properties, we use a
scale from 1 to 2 with steps of 0.25. An employee is classified
according to the sum of the criticality levels of his permissions.
These depend on the internal directives of the organization
and have to be determined in interviews with the responsible
staff members. For example, the criticality level of high-risk
permissions may be 15, the one for medium-risk permissions
may be 5, and the one for low-risk permissions may be 1.
TABLE II. EXEMPLARY CRITICALITY CLASSIFICATION SCHEME
Employee criticality Sum of permission criticalities
Very low (y = 1) < 50
Low (y = 1.25) 50− 100
Medium (y = 1.5) 100− 150
High (y = 1.75) 150− 200
Very high (y = 2) > 200
B. Outlier Assessments
We further take account of the dynamic nature of trust
by integrating a usage-related component into our trust cal-
culations. This usage trust is based on positive and nega-
tive assessments of conspicuous outlier permissions. Positive
means that the employee is officially approved to own the
particular outlier permission. Negative means that he may have
obtained it in an informal way. A typical example for this is
an employee asking a colleague to quickly assign permissions
to him without obtaining official approval beforehand. The
outlier detection can be performed automatically with the help
of access control data cleansing methods. For more details
on these techniques, see [22]. The assessments are provided
by domain experts and are aggregated with the help of a
beta probability density function (PDF) according to the beta
reputation system introduced by Jøsang and Ismail [12]. The
reason for basing our usage-related component on the beta
PDF is its suitability for describing the probability distribution
of binary events. We calculate the component as:
Trustu =
α
α+ β
(2)
In the original beta model, α is defined as α = r+1 and β
is defined as β = s+1. r is the number of positive assessments
whereas s is the number of negative assessments. In this
form, all assessments carry the same weight. This especially
means that old assessments are just as important as more
recent ones. However, Jøsang and Ismail [12] additionally
propose a forgetting scheme that discounts old feedback by
multiplying it with a forgetting factor 0 < λ < 1. It is also
possible to use different forgetting factors λ and σ for positive
and negative assessments, respectively. Applying the forgetting
scheme leads to r =
∑n
k=0 rkλ
k and s =
∑n
k=0 skσ
k.
This results in the following clarification of Eq. (2):
Trustu =
∑n
k=0 rkλ
k + 1∑n
k=0 rkλ
k + 1 +
∑n
k=0 skσ
k + 1
(3)
r0 and s0 are the most recent assessments whereas rn and
sn are the oldest ones. In case of a positive assessment, one
has rk = 1 and sk = 0. In case of a negative assessment, one
has rk = 0 and sk = 1. To illustrate the functioning of the
forgetting scheme, Table III shows an example in which three
assessments have taken place. The first assessment is negative,
the following two assessments are positive. The employed
forgetting factors are λ = 0.7 and σ = 0.9. This means that
positive assessments are forgotten comparably fast whereas
negative assessments have a considerable influence for a long
time. Observing the values for r and s, it can be seen that the
kth assessments are discounted by λk and σk, respectively.
Nielsen et al. [23] call this principle “exponential decay”.
TABLE III. FORGETTING SCHEME FOR A NEGATIVE (N) ASSESSMENT
FOLLOWED BY TWO POSITIVE (P) ASSESSMENTS (λ = 0.7, σ = 0.9)
Assessments r s α β Trustu
N 0 1 1 2 0.33333
PN 1 + 0 0 + 0.9 2 1.9 0.51282
PPN 1 + 0.7 + 0 0 + 0 + 0.81 2.7 1.81 0.59867
By putting together the time-related and the usage-related
component (cf. Eq. (1) and Eq. (3)) and providing the opportu-
nity to assign different weights ωt and ωu to them, we receive
the following metric for the total trust value of an employee:
Trust = ωtTrustt + ωuTrustu (4)
C. Recertification Threshold
In order to be able to arrive at a particular recertification
decision, the total trust value (cf. Eq. (4)) developed in the
course of this section has to be related to a predefined threshold
at which the recertification is required by law. This threshold
has to be reached at the latest when the time-related component
becomes 0. Thus, it has to be equal to the maximum value of
the weighted usage-related component. Since the maximum
value is reached if there are only positive and no negative
assessments (i.e. rk = 1, sk = 0 for all k = 0, ..., n), the
threshold is defined as follows. Note that the geometric series∑n
k=0 λ
k is equal to 1−λ
k
1−λ and converges to
1
1−λ for limn→∞.
θ = lim
n→∞ωu
∑n
k=0 λ
k + 1∑n
k=0 λ
k + 1 + 0 + 1
= ωu
1
1−λ + 1
1
1−λ + 2
(5)
If the total trust value of an employee is above the
threshold, he is able to activate his permissions without any
restrictions. If it is below the threshold, the employee’s per-
missions have to be recertified by a domain expert.
IV. USE CASE
In the following, we demonstrate the practical applicability
of our trust-based recertification concept in a fictional use case.
Our company data has been designed according to practical
information from a real-world example with industry-standard
assumptions. The company – hereinafter called “Weyland
Industries” – is a medium-sized enterprise in the robotics
manufacturing industry. Its master data comprises 4,114 em-
ployees, which can be assigned a selection of 1,171 access
privileges. This amounts to 86,104 user-access assignments in
total. The assignments result from breaking down the access
control model in place into a direct access model. Dissolving
the initially hierarchical and aggregated access control helps in
having a detailed view on each employee’s access privileges.
The employees are distributed within 343 departments in a
typical hierarchical structure. The employee data is enriched
with additional information from various applications allowing
for a structured analysis including employee context. Further-
more, Weyland Industries is providing a list of 233 risky
access privileges. 111 of them are marked as high-risk, the
rest imposes medium risk to the respective activation.
The company is facing two challenges resulting in a need
of improvement of the current processes. Up to now, the
company has recertified the employees once per year, which
leads to a significant overhead during the recertification period
and presents obstacles to the daily manufacturing business.
This reasons in the fact that business responsibles are drawn
away from their daily work in order to come up with access
control decisions by means of job functions and activities
of their respective employees. Adding up to this issue, the
marketing department has noted an increased customer need
for certifications of qualifications and security standards. In
order to proof a professional information security management
to its customers, the strategic department of the company has
decided to acquire the ISO/IEC 27001 certification. Section
11 of the Annex to ISO/IEC 27001 demands for structured
deployment of managing access to resources. Furthermore, the
certification requires a risk-based system in order to identify
high-risk employees [4]. The two main goals are as follows:
• Business responsibles should be lifted from the heavy-
weight recertification blocks.
• Employees’ privilege assignments with risky access
should be identified for complying with the ISO/IEC
27001 certification.
To achieve the two goals, Weyland Industries is planing on
integrating our proposed approach into their existing Identity
Intelligence System (IIS) which is monitoring and analyzing
the functionality of the Identity and Access Management Sys-
tem (IAMS). In order to evaluate the functionality of our trust-
based recertifications, the enterprise is testing its applicability
in the marketing department. We consider the two employees
Bolek and Botero to illustrate our concept. Table IV contains
all details regarding their employee properties as well as their
permission criticalities that are necessary to compute the decay
factor of the trust-related component. The decay variables x
and y are determined according to the specifications introduced
in Section III-A. They are weighted equally.
During their time of employment, the two employees
have been subject to several outlier assessments according to
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Fig. 2. Progression of the trust values of the two employees
Section III-B. The outlier assessments inherently resolve the
goal of the company project aiming at an identification of
risky employees. Bolek has received three positive assessment
followed by two negative ones and again by five positive
ones. Botero has received one negative assessment in the first
month of his employment. Since then, he has received nine
positive ones. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that both
employees do not receive any assessments during the year of
consideration. Thus, the values for α, β and Trustu remain
constant within this period. They are also included in Table
IV. To calculate them, we use λ = 0.7 and σ = 0.9 (see
Section III-B). In this first use case, we weight the time-related
component with ωt = 0.7 and the usage-related component
with ωu = 0.3. This yields the graphs depicted in Figure 2.
The recertification threshold is θ = 0.3 ·
1
1−0.7+1
1
1−0.7+2
= 0.24375.
TABLE IV. RECERTIFICATION DATA OF THE TWO EMPLOYEES
Bolek Botero
Position IT clerk (x1 = 2) Strat. assistant (x1 = 1.25)
Entry date 2 years ago (x2 = 1.75) 8 years ago (x2 = 1.5)
Contract type 3-year (x3 = 1.5) Permanent (x3 = 1)
Job history 2 competitors (x4 = 2) Loyal employee (x4 = 1)
x 1.8125 1.1875
High-risk perm. 13 · 15 = 195 0 · 15 = 0
Medium-risk perm. 16 · 5 = 80 2 · 5 = 10
Low-risk perm. 14 ·1 = 14 31 · 1 = 31
y 2 (289) 1 (41)
Trustt 1− 1.90625 · t360 1− 1.09375 · t360
Assessments PPPPPNNPPP NPPPPPPPPP
α 3.95346 4.19882
β 2.12193 1.38742
Trustu 0.65073 0.75164
TrustBolek(t) 0.7 · (1− 1.90625 · t360 ) + 0.3 · 0.65073
TrustBotero(t) 0.7 · (1− 1.09375 · t360 ) + 0.3 · 0.75164
Several observations can be made in connection with
Figure 2. Firstly, Bolek’s time trust decreases much faster
than Botero’s. This is due to his comparably low position in
the organization as well as his riskier permissions. Secondly,
Bolek’s usage trust is lower than Botero’s because his two
negative assessments have a stronger influence than Botero’s.
Note that both total trust values do not start at 1 because of
the decreased usage trust of both employees. Thirdly, the def-
inition of the recertification threshold is absolutely necessary.
Otherwise, Botero’s permissions would have to be recertified
not until after the compliance deadline of one year. The overall
goal of diversification of recertification periods is supported in
this example by Bolek’s early recertification after 178 days.
Additionally, this aids in the identification of risky employees.
While Botero’s recertification point (321 days) is close to the
one year period, Bolek can be seen as a risk factor within
the company because of the rapid decay of his trust value.
The rest of the company’s employees needs to be analyzed in
the same manner in order to fully complete the recertification
goals stated above.
V. CONCLUSION
Recertification represents a means of maintaining com-
pliant access control within an organization for the price of
a high administrative effort. We argue that periodic recerti-
fications are not the best choice and rather recommend to
individually conduct them when appropriate. To determine
these points in time, we employed a trust value based on
employee context, temporal decay and expert information on
excessive permission. Nevertheless, integration of company-
specific requirements and data can easily be integrated into
our approach. By introducing a use case, we demonstrated the
applicability of our concept.
Despite the aforementioned benefits, there are some lim-
itations to our proposal. One major issue is that we do not
have any data on the suitability of different forgetting factors
for our beta PDF-based usage component because there are no
publications describing sophisticated evaluations of this [24].
Performing the necessary optimizations on our own is out of
the scope of this workshop paper. Regardless of the forgetting
factors, there may be better models than the beta PDF-based
one for describing our usage component (e.g. hidden Markov
models). However, the increased complexity of these models
may make parameter prediction even more challenging [25].
Similarly to the parameterization of the usage component,
optimizing the weighting factors included in our model is an
aspect for future work as well. Moreover, there should also be
experiments on replacing the linear decay function in our time
component with more sophisticated metrics.
For future work, we intend to further investigate the pre-
sented approach. In a next step, we plan to carry out a real-
world evaluation with an industrial partner and to integrate
the presented solution into an IAMS. In addition, we plan to
examine how this concept can be combined with other trust-
based concepts within IAM.
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